CONTAGIOUS PARTIES

Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe

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ABSTRACT

Anti-immigration parties have experienced electoral lift-off in most Western democracies, although the consequences of their victories for real-life policy outcomes have remained largely unexplored. A key question is: do electoral pressures from anti-immigration parties have a ‘contagion’ impact on other parties’ immigration policy positions? In this article, I argue and empirically demonstrate that this is the case. On the basis of a comparative-empirical study of 75 parties in 11 Western European countries, I conclude that this contagion effect involves entire party systems rather than the mainstream right only. In addition, I find that opposition parties are more vulnerable to this contagion effect than parties in government. The findings of this article imply that anti-immigration parties are able to influence policy output in their political systems without entering government.

KEY WORDS: anti-immigration parties, elections, immigration, Western Europe

Introduction

Anti-immigration parties have emerged in most Western democracies and in some countries have enjoyed considerable electoral success. Many scholars have studied the factors underlying the electoral performance of these parties because it is these parties that affect real-life policy outcomes in their countries (e.g. Golder, 2003; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Electoral success does not automatically translate into policy influence, however, so the question concerns the extent to which the policy influence of anti-immigration parties is related to their electoral fortunes.

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Needless to say, the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties has an impact on the direct policy influence they can exercise in parliament and, if they gain access to power, in office (see Heinisch, 2003). Anti-immigration parties’ electoral success might also exert indirect effects, i.e. by influencing other parties’ policy positions (see also Williams, 2006: 51). To what extent is this the case? Do electoral pressures from anti-immigration parties exert ‘contagion effects’ on the positions of other parties on the issues that they try to mobilize on, most notably, immigration? This is the main question guiding my article.

This question is seldom addressed, which is perhaps surprising as the answers are interesting from a scientific perspective. The extent to which anti-immigration parties affect party competition is a relevant question in several research fields. Moreover, its importance goes beyond scientific interest. If such contagion effects exist, then the presence of anti-immigration parties would affect policy-making throughout Western Europe, which would raise all kinds of questions about the desirability of this situation.

Here, I focus on a key issue of anti-immigration parties, namely immigration policy. I assess whether the electoral success of anti-immigration parties has any effect on the positions of the other parties in contemporary Western European countries regarding immigration, and, if so, what it is. I focus on one type of impact, defined in terms of Downsian spatial competition. An effect is considered ‘contagion’ if other parties shift to more restrictive immigration policy positions after electoral success of the anti-immigration party in their country. I measure contagion effects in various ways, not only concerning right-wing parties – compare with the ‘contagion of the right thesis’ (e.g. Norris, 2005) – but also contagion affecting the party system as a whole.

Previous Work

It is a widely held belief that the electoral victories of anti-immigration parties cause other parties to copy these parties’ rhetoric. The existing literature suggests ‘contagion effects’ of two kinds. First, established parties are said to have shifted to the right (Harmel and Svasand, 1997; Norris, 2005). Second, many researchers share the view that the mainstream parties have co-opted restrictive immigration policies (Downs, 2002; Minkenberg, 2002; Pettigrew, 1998; Schain, 1987, 2002). As the core issue of anti-immigration parties is immigration (e.g. Betz, 2002; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003), and these parties’ positions on the left–right axis vary considerably (e.g. Lubbers, 2001; Norris, 2005), the expectations concerning the immigration dimension are much more straightforward than those regarding left and right. This article therefore focuses on contagion effects regarding immigration.

The first reports regarding co-optation by the establishment of anti-immigration policies and rhetoric date back 20 years. In the late 1980s, Schain wrote that established French parties had partly adopted the anti-
immigration rhetoric of the National Front (1987). In particular, the mainstream right had co-opted anti-immigration views, according to Schain (1987: 242). In his more recent work (2002), Schain gives examples of mainstream politicians from both the left (Fabius in 1985) and the right (Balladur in 1998) who tried to open up the debate on the policy positions taken by the National Front (2002: 238, 240). Similarly, Minkenberg (2002) reports an ‘agenda-setting effect’ in France, leading the other parties to co-opt the agenda of the National Front. In his view, the situation in Germany is similar to that in France, with the ‘major parties’ embrace of the right-wing definition of the “asylum problem” in 1992’ (2002: 267).

In the same vein as Schain and Minkenberg, Pettigrew (1998) states that ‘while far-right efforts have gained only minimal power directly, they have shifted the entire political spectrum to the right on immigration’ (p. 95). He maintains that this thesis holds not only for Europe, but also for the United States and Australia.

In a similar vein, William Downs emphasizes that the strategy of co-optation of policies by other parties is widespread across Western Europe (2001). Downs gives examples concerning various parties, among them the Social Democratic Party in Denmark, arguing that the co-opting of strategies can be witnessed on both the left and right of the political spectrum (2001, 2002).

A notable exception to the consensus on the contagion regarding the immigration issue is a study by Perlmutter, who concludes that the influence of anti-immigration parties in Germany and Italy regarding immigration was small (2002). It is very likely, Perlmutter argues, that the mainstream parties in these countries would also have become more restrictive on immigration without the emergence of the Republicans (REP) in Germany and the Northern League (LN) in Italy in the early 1990s.

This brief overview makes clear that the academic debate on contagion effects revolves around two questions, which both follow from the application of Downsian spatial analysis. Do anti-immigration parties exert contagion effects on the immigration issue? And, if so, is only the right affected by this contagion, or the left as well? These are two of the questions that I aim to answer in this article. Another question addressed is the extent to which the responses in terms of policy positioning can be explained by Downsian spatial competition for votes.

Approach

In the relevant literature, the notion of contagion builds on the landmark theory of electoral competition developed by Anthony Downs (1957). This theory takes into account the relevant actors at elections: voters on the one hand and parties on the other. The electoral process is described in this theory as an electoral market with parties on the “supply side” and voters on the
‘demand side’. In this view, the co-optation of an anti-immigration party’s policies by a rival party can be understood as an inter-party electoral strategy.

Let us initially assume, in accordance with Downs’ theory, that parties are rational actors involved in competition for votes along a (one-dimensional) spatial continuum, and that voter preferences are distributed along this dimension as well. Parties will, in that case, strategically adapt their positions in attempts to attract more voters. If a particular competitor performs well in particular elections, it is reasonable for the other parties to expect many voters to be close to their competitor’s position on the continuum. These parties will therefore expect to attract more voters by moving closer to their competitor’s position.

If we assume, furthermore, that the immigration issue has some degree of salience in contemporary Western Europe, parties are expected to adjust their policy positions on immigration to substantial changes in the political context in which they are operating. Thus, they will adjust their immigration policy position according to the electoral performance of an anti-immigration party. After all, previous research suggests that voters do not prefer such a party over the mainstream right on the basis of just any issue, but because of their positions on specific issues, most notably immigration (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005b; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2000). Of course, these parties campaign on other platforms as well, such as law and order, corruption and populism. However, they usually link these themes to immigration. Moreover, immigration issues are widely considered to be their main concern (e.g. Betz, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008).

When focusing on immigration policy positions only, however, following Downs runs the risk of an oversimplified picture being presented. Ever since Downs’ major publication more than 50 years ago, spatial theory has been developed and improved upon (e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1990; Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Shepsle, 1991). Major modifications were guided by the insight that parties compete not just by taking a position on a specific issue, but also by emphasizing particular issues more than others (e.g. Budge et al., 1987). In addition, parties can try to prevent specific issues from gaining salience by, for example, ignoring the entire issue. In Schattschneider’s words, a ‘conclusive way of checking the rise of conflict is simply to provide no arena for it’ (1975 [1960]: 65).

In a recent article, Meguid (2005) presents a ‘modified spatial theory’ that improves upon the standard spatial models, among other things, by adding the insight that parties may influence the salience of particular issues. This means that, first of all, when an anti-immigration party enters the political scene the other parties may react by copying the anti-immigration stance (what Meguid calls an ‘accommodative’ strategy), by taking up a radically different position (‘adversarial’), or by not taking any stance at all (‘dismissive’). Second, this means that not only the mainstream right, but also ‘non-proximal’ parties, can affect the salience of the immigration issue. As Meguid empirically demonstrates, the three types of strategy waged by both
proximal and non-proximal parties affect the electoral fortunes of green and anti-immigration parties.

In this article, the causal chain examined by Meguid is reversed. Instead of examining the impact of other parties’ policy positions on anti-immigration parties’ success, I study the effects of anti-immigration parties’ electoral success on other parties’ policy positions. In Meguid’s terms, this article revolves around ‘accommodative’ versus ‘adversarial’ strategies. Note that immigration policy outcomes are more likely to be affected by these two strategies than by ‘dismissive’ strategies.

**Hypotheses**

In view of the theoretical considerations mentioned above, it can be expected that if parties that are fierce advocates of immigration restriction become successful in the electoral arena, the other parties will – all other things being equal – adjust their positions more to the restrictive end of an immigration restriction scale. Thus, the following hypothesis can be stated (Hypothesis 1):

**Hypothesis 1:** The more electoral success an anti-immigration party has, the more the other parties in the political system become restrictive on immigration.

Another parameter that is mentioned in the existing literature as relevant to contagion effects is party positioning in terms of left and right. In theory, mainstream right-wing parties have an extra incentive to adjust their stances on immigration, compared to left-wing parties, after anti-immigration party victories (see also Norris, 2005). After all, the logic of Downsian spatial competition in the context of contemporary Western Europe predicts that rightist parties are threatened to a larger extent by anti-immigration party success than leftist parties are. In accordance with this view, the results of earlier research suggest that it is mainly the established right that competes for votes with anti-immigration parties in Western Europe (e.g. Carter, 2005: 206; Van der Brug et al., 2005: 560). In addition, it may be relatively easy for right-wing parties to adopt a hard line on immigration, as they typically ‘own’ the issues of cultural unity and national pride. As Bale notes, a tough stance on immigration ‘can often be reconciled with a tradition of defending the nation and its culture from external threats’ (2008: 463). For these reasons, parties of the right are expected to yield more to electoral pressures from anti-immigration parties than parties of the left (Hypothesis 2):

**Hypothesis 2:** The more right-wing it is, the more susceptible a party is to contagion effects on the immigration issue.

The first two hypotheses build on theories of party competition in the Downsian sense. However, parties are not always expected to behave in a straightforward way as predicted by Downsian spatial analysis. It is argued
in the existing literature that parties do not always compete in similar ways, or to the same extent, with each other (e.g. Adams et al., 2006). In addition, based on the ‘modified spatial theory’ (Meguid, 2005), not only right-wing parties are expected to compete with anti-immigration parties for votes, but also left-wing parties. Meguid illustrates this with the example of French communist voters who switched to Le Pen in 1986 (Meguid, 2005: 348). As a result, the left may also have repositioned on the immigration issue, as research on Austria, Denmark, Norway and The Netherlands suggests (Bale et al., 2008). If this holds true, then the second hypothesis should be disconfirmed. After all, the modified spatial theory provides no a priori reason for expecting right-wing parties to adjust their policy positions to a greater extent than left-wing parties.

In addition, this leads us to more specific expectations about contagion effects. Two hypotheses will be added to Hypotheses 1 and 2, specifying two categories of parties that face possible constraints in the possibilities they have to adjust their policy positions to a changed political environment. A first relevant subsample is that of parties in government. Parties are hypothesized to be less prone to repositioning on the immigration issue when in office than when in opposition, because government status is associated with constraints. From both legal and practical perspectives, it is difficult for parties to make any sudden changes to their policies when in government: not just because they may have their own track record on the issue, but also because their policies are not independent of those of their predecessors. Moreover, their governing status makes it riskier for parties to make bold statements on any policy issue, because such statements would raise expectations among voters that the parties are unlikely to meet. Problems linked to immigration have proved to be both relatively complex and largely beyond the control of national governments. Parties in coalition governments face additional constraints, as they also have to deal with their coalition partners in general, and to comply with an – often detailed – governing contract with these partners in particular.

An additional reason for expecting that government parties are less prone to give in to electoral pressures to shift on new issues such as the immigration issue is related to governing as a party goal. To the extent that parties are office-seeking, parties in opposition are expected to be more willing to try different strategies and to adopt new stances than governing parties. After all, parties in opposition are expected to be anxious to gain or regain access to power. Parties in government, by contrast, have weaker incentives to revise policy positions that have proved successful in past elections. I therefore formulate a third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Parties in government are less susceptible to contagion effects on the immigration issue than parties in opposition.

A similar logic applies to another group of parties. It is argued that niche parties are ‘fundamentally different’ in the way they compete in the electoral
arena (Adams et al., 2006). More specifically, it has been empirically shown that these parties lose votes if they change their own ideological positions, at least in terms of left and right – the reason why these parties were described as ‘prisoners of their own ideologies’, having ‘no real choice other than to cling to the policy ground they have staked out for themselves’ (Adams et al., 2006: 526). If this is the case, then the ‘niche parties’ investigated in this study – (former) communist and green parties – are expected to differ from the other parties in the sense that they do not shift on the immigration issue according to the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties (Hypothesis 4):9

Hypothesis 4: Green and (ex-)communist parties are less susceptible to contagion effects on the immigration issue than other parties.10

**Anti-Immigration Parties**

In order to measure the contagion effects of anti-immigration parties, these parties should first be distinguished from the others. Following Fennema, anti-immigration parties are defined as parties that employ the immigration issue as their main political concern in electoral campaigns, or are viewed by elites of other parties as doing so (Fennema, 1997). So, these parties are thought not only to be strongly in favour of immigration restriction, but also to attach much importance to the immigration issue.

The operationalization of the concept of anti-immigration party is based on these two criteria, as follows.11 First, all the parties that have a fierce anti-immigration stance are selected. In accordance with the literature (Lubbers, 2001; Norris, 2005), positions towards the immigration issue are used for case selection in this article. As in the studies mentioned, these positions are derived from expert surveys. Parties placed at the extreme of an ‘immigration restriction’ scale by country experts are provisionally labelled anti-immigration parties (criterion one).12 Such parties all scored higher than any party founded before the start of mass immigration to Western Europe ever scored, which is over 8.5 on this 0–10 scale.

In a next step, the parties that do not attach more importance (criterion two) to the immigration issue than any established party ever did are erased from the provisional list of ‘anti-immigration parties’ and put into the category of ‘other parties’. Hence, parties scoring less than 18.0 on a 1–20 immigration importance scale by Benoit and Laver (2006) are not selected.

As a result of this two-step selection procedure, the parties viewed as anti-immigration in this study are highly comparable across time and countries.
Data

In order to address the research question, I select a time span during which there was a wide variety in electoral performance of anti-immigration parties, and take into account several countries that are comparable in many other respects. I therefore study 13 political systems in 12 Western European countries, from 1990 onwards. Since 1990, several anti-immigration parties, such as the Flemish Bloc, have obtained more than 10 percent of the vote in elections to the national parliament, and others, such as the Northern League in Italy, have joined government coalitions. Many other parties, by contrast, such as the Center Democrats in The Netherlands, remained without any electoral success. Four main datasets are employed in this article, data derived from an expert survey conducted by Lubbers (2001), a similar one by Van Spanje et al. (2006), the European Election Study (EES) 1999 and data on electoral system traits collected by Carter (2005).

Expert survey results reported by Lubbers (2001) and by Van Spanje et al. (2006) are used for party positions on the issue of immigration. The use of expert surveys has its advantages and disadvantages compared to other ways of measuring the relevant party characteristics, including judgements on the basis of party origins, secondary reading, mass surveys, elite studies and the analysis of party manifestos (Mair, 2001: 12–17). In this case, no viable alternatives are available, because these two expert survey datasets are the only ones that allow for cross-time and cross-country comparisons of immigration party positions. Lubbers asked experts to provide a 0–10 ‘immigration restriction’ score for the parties in the countries of their expertise. His questionnaire was sent by regular mail to 288 political scientists in 17 countries in 2000. The overall return rate after two reminders was 52 percent (Lubbers, 2001). The resulting immigration restriction scores in 2000 of the parties included in the analysis range from 0.9 (RC in Italy) to 9.1 (MS-FT in Italy), with a mean of 4.6 and a standard deviation of 2.2.

The immigration position question was replicated in an expert survey concerning the situation in 2004 (Van Spanje et al., 2006). A group of 557 political scientists in the same countries as in Lubbers’ study were invited by email to answer exactly the same question in their country of expertise concerning the situation in 2004. The experts were carefully selected on the basis of the websites of universities and academic institutions worldwide. The overall response rate of 39 percent after one reminder (Van Spanje et al., 2006) was comparable to similar expert surveys conducted before this; Huber and Inglehart, for example, report a response rate of 41 percent (1995). For 2004, the relevant immigration party positions have a mean of 4.8 and a standard deviation of 2.0. The scores vary between 0.8 for the RC in Italy and 9.3 for the MPF in France. The change in immigration policy positions between 2000 and 2004 provides the values of the dependent variable at the second time-point.15
On the basis of the case selection procedure outlined in the previous section, 26 parties in Western Europe are labelled as anti-immigration. The group of parties considered as anti-immigration is very similar to that of comparable studies (e.g. Gibson, 2002; Golder, 2003; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2000). See Table 1 for the list of the 26 parties in Western Europe that are identified as ‘anti-immigration’.

These parties’ electoral scores constitute the main independent variable of the analyses presented in this article. The electoral scores before the start of the measurement of the dependent variable are added to the analysis, that is, between 1990 and 2000. The main independent variable pertaining to Hypothesis 1 (anti-immigration party success) is the change in the average national-level electoral performance of all the anti-immigration parties taken together in a political system in the decade before the first measurement point concerning the dependent variable. This variable has a mean of +1.86, a standard deviation of 3.44, a minimum of −5.5 percent (in Sweden).

### Table 1. Twenty-six anti-immigration parties in Western Europe (1990–2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Freedom Party of Austria</td>
<td>FPÖ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – Flanders</td>
<td>Flemish Bloc</td>
<td>VB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – Wallonia</td>
<td>To Act</td>
<td>Agir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium – Wallonia</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>FN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – Wallonia</td>
<td>New Front of Belgium</td>
<td>FNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium – Wallonia</td>
<td>Party of the New Forces</td>
<td>PFN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>British National Party</td>
<td>BNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Danish People's Party</td>
<td>DF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
<td>FrP</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>National Front</td>
<td>FN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>National Republican Movement</td>
<td>MNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>German People’s Union</td>
<td>DVU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
<td>NPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Republicans</td>
<td>REP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>LN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Centre Democrats</td>
<td>CD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Centre Party ’86</td>
<td>CP’86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Fatherland Party</td>
<td>FLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
<td>FrP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>The New Party</td>
<td>DNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>New Democrats</td>
<td>NyD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Car Party/Freedom Party of Switzerland</td>
<td>AP/FPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>National Action/Swiss Democrats</td>
<td>NA/SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Swiss People’s Party</td>
<td>SVP</td>
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and a maximum of +7.1 percent (in Flanders). The average of the national-level electoral performance of all anti-immigration parties per country is also added in order to control for the fact that some countries have more successful anti-immigration parties than others. The average anti-immigration party success by country in the 1990s varies from 0.0 in Britain to 22.5 percent of the national vote in Austria (mean = 8.3, SD = 7.2).

The starting point of the period under study is 1990, the date of the first measurement point of immigration restriction scores that define the case selection. Only the national level is taken into account in this research, as electoral performance at this level is bound to have the largest contagion impact. National-level elections are seen as the most important, ‘first-order’ elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). It is important to note that there is a wide variation in the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties included in the study. For example, the lack of success of the British National Party (BNP) contrasts with the meteoric rise of Haider’s Freedom Party in Austria (FPÖ). Needless to say, the latter party is expected to have a larger impact on party competition than the former.

From the EES 1999, left–right party positions have been derived in order to test Hypothesis 2. The EES 1999 is a stand-alone survey conducted immediately after the European Parliamentary election that year, using random samples of voters in each of the member states of the European Union. The number of interviews carried out varies between the countries from 500 to over 3,000. The study is extensively documented on the European Elections Studies (EES) website (http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net). The EES datasets are very well suited for comparative research, as has been shown in many studies (e.g. Van der Brug et al., 2000; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996). Voters’ perceptions of party positions in terms of left and right have proved similar to left–right estimations based on manifesto contents, roll-call voting behaviour and the perceptions of parliamentarians (Van der Brug, 1998, 1999; Van der Brug and Van der Eijk, 1999). Moreover, the perceptions of voters are cross-checked with those of experts, and turn out to be almost identical (Benoit and Laver, 2006; Lubbers, 2001; Marks and Steenbergen, 1999). Measurement of the left–right positions of all the parties in the dataset results in a mean of 5.0, ranging from 1.0 (the Unity List in Denmark) to 9.7 (MS-FT in Italy), with a standard deviation of 1.9.

Carter (2005) collected data on an institutional variable concerning the electoral system that the relevant literature (e.g. Norris, 2005) suggests controlling for. This is the effective electoral threshold in a country, nationwide (Carter, 2005). The threshold a party has to pass in order to be represented in the national parliament ranges from 0.5 in Finland to the estimated figure of 37.5 in France and the United Kingdom (Carter, 2005: 149–151, 154). The mean value of this variable is 8.52; the standard deviation is 12.30.

Each party for which all the adequate data are available from these four sources is included in the analysis. Data concerning the relevant time periods (from 1990 to 1999 regarding the independent variables and between

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2000 and 2004 for the dependent variable) are available for 75 parties in the 13 political systems under study.

Of the 75 parties, 36 (48 percent) have served in government between the two measurement points of January 2000 (Lubbers, 2001) and June 2004 (Van Spanje et al., 2006). A dummy variable was included to distinguish these parties from opposition parties.

A dichotomous variable separates niche parties from other parties. Niche parties are classified following the relevant literature (Adams et al., 2006; Meguid, 2005). Of the 75 parties, 19 are identified as niche parties (25 percent).

Finally, a control variable was added that identifies parties that formed coalition governments including an anti-immigration party. It could be expected that such parties would have been particularly affected by contagion on the immigration issue, perhaps accounting for any overall effect that might otherwise be found. A dummy variable identifying parties that governed together with anti-immigration parties is therefore included in the analysis to control for this possible effect. Out of 75 parties, 14 have been in government together with an anti-immigration party, or with an anti-immigration party supporting the government. This is 19 percent of the total of 75 parties.

For descriptive analyses of the dependent and independent variables, see Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. Descriptive analyses of the dependent and independent variables</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in immigration position 2000–4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2 variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective threshold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average anti-immigration party success 1990–2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in anti-immigration party success 1990–2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 variables</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niche party</td>
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<tr>
<td>L–R position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government cooperation with anti-immigration party</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Carter (2005); Lubbers (2001); Van Spanje et al. (2006).*
Method

Contagion effects are measured by way of cross-sectional multivariate analyses on immigration policy positions with party (other than anti-immigration party) as the unit of analysis. The way of modelling, hierarchical linear modelling, takes into account that the 75 observations are clustered by polity (Hox, 2002: 1). Hierarchical linear regression models are estimated by way of restricted maximum likelihood estimation with the change in positions between 2000 and 2004 taken up by the parties that were not anti-immigration as the dependent variable. The significance of the effects is assessed on the basis of robust standard errors.

The main independent variable pertaining to Hypothesis 1 (anti-immigration party success) is the change in the average national-level electoral performance of all the anti-immigration parties taken together in a political system in the decade before the first measurement point concerning the dependent variable. A positive effect of the Hypothesis 1 variable would indicate that anti-immigration party success is associated with subsequent immigration policy shifts by other parties, which would be consistent with the first hypothesis.

For Hypothesis 2 (vulnerability of parties that are more to the right), the left–right party positions of each of the parties under study are added, as well as the interaction of these positions with the main independent variable. If the interaction variable yields a significant positive effect, the second hypothesis is confirmed. After all, parties that score higher on a 1–10 left–right scale are expected to shift more to the upper end of the 0–10 immigration restriction scale if the anti-immigration party vote gains are higher.

Testing the third hypothesis (governing parties are less susceptible to contagion) also requires two additional variables. A dummy variable is included in the model, distinguishing parties in government from parties that were in opposition during (part of) the period between 2000 and 2004. Unless its interaction with the Hypothesis 1 variable yields a substantial negative effect, the third hypothesis is to be rejected. If it yields a negative effect, roughly equal to the size of the (positive) effect of the Hypothesis 1 variable, this would mean that contagion effects only pertain to opposition parties.

In order to test Hypothesis 4 (niche parties are less susceptible to contagion), a dummy variable distinguishing niche parties (N = 19) from the other parties is added to the analysis. Classification is based on the description of niche parties in the relevant literature (Adams et al., 2006; Meguid, 2005). In order to satisfy expectations from the extant literature, the interaction of this dummy with the Hypothesis 1 variable should be significantly negative, demonstrating that niche parties shift significantly less on the immigration issue than other parties after anti-immigration party victories.
Results

Let us now turn to anti-immigration party success and the ideological positions of the other parties. Does the electoral performance of the anti-immigration parties matter for the immigration positions of established parties (Hypothesis 1)? See Model 1 in Table 3 for the results of the first analysis.

Table 3. Models explaining change in immigration policy position of 75 Western European parties, 2000–4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b (RSE)</td>
<td>b (RSE)</td>
<td>b (RSE)</td>
<td>b (RSE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party-level variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niche party</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L–R position</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing party</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government cooperation with anti-immigration party</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective threshold</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average anti-immigration party success 1990–2000</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in anti-immigration party success 1990–2000 (Hypothesis 1)</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-level interaction variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing party × Change in anti-immigration party success 1990–2000 (Hypothesis 3)</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N party level</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance component party level</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N country level</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance component country level</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.14**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>183.59</td>
<td>180.02</td>
<td>177.05</td>
<td>161.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d.f. = 2)</td>
<td>(d.f. = 2)</td>
<td>(d.f. = 4)</td>
<td>(d.f. = 4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (one-tailed). Robust standard errors (RSE), computed using the software HLM, are presented in parentheses. All the continuous variables in the models are centred around their grand means.
Model 1 fits the data reasonably well (Deviance = 183.59, d.f. = 2). The results in Table 3 indicate that $0.12/(0.12 + 0.58) = 17\%$ of the variance in change in party positioning on the immigration issue in 2004 is at the country level (Model 1), which is significantly different from zero. This also means that the expected correlation of the values of the dependent variable of two randomly drawn parties in the same country is 0.17. Clearly, the assumption of independent observations is violated. Hierarchical modelling is required to account for this violation (Hox, 2002: 1).

When I add the party-level and country-level variables (Model 2), only one of them yields a significant effect in the predicted direction. The variable pertaining to Hypothesis 1, the anti-immigration party success change, has a positive impact that reaches statistical significance at the $p = 0.05$ level (one-tailed). Based on Model 2, one would predict that a 1 percent increase in electoral performance of anti-immigration parties in the country in the 1990s leads to an average shift of 0.11 points on a 0–10 immigration restriction scale by (all) other parties in the country.

Unexpectedly, the niche party dummy has a strong positive effect. This suggests that niche parties actually shift more on the immigration issue than other parties do, at least when the change in anti-immigration party success is at its mean. Interestingly, the positive impact of the niche party dummy, the size of which is more than four times its standard error, indicates that niche parties are not immobile at all. Indeed, Model 2 indicates that, on average, these parties shifted substantially more to the restrictive end of the immigration restriction scale than other parties between 2000 and 2004. Note that this holds even after controlling for the fact that almost all of the niche parties are in opposition (15 out of 19 niche parties in my dataset). Examples of niche parties that repositioned on the immigration issue are the French communists (+1.7 on the 0–10 scale), Greek communists (+1.8) and the Greens in Denmark and Italy (both +1.6). Furthermore, Model 2 suggests that the more left-wing a party, the more restrictive on immigration it became. Both effects would be significant if a two-tailed test ($p < 0.05$) was applied. None of the other variables have a significant impact.

In order to test Hypotheses 2–4, I examine whether the slopes of the left–right party placement (Hypothesis 2), the government party dichotomous variable (Hypothesis 3) and the niche party identifier (Hypothesis 4) vary across countries. As it turns out (not shown), the slope of the government status dummy varies significantly whereas that of the ideological party placement and the niche party dummy do not. This indicates that the effects of left–right and niche party status do not significantly vary across countries, and thus do not vary according to (country-specific) anti-immigration party success. In other words, left-wing and niche parties are no less affected by anti-immigration contagion than other parties. The second and fourth hypotheses are therefore to be rejected.

As the effect of the government party dummy significantly varies by country, I attempt to explain this variation by including a cross-level inter-
action of this dummy with anti-immigration party success (Model 3). As it turns out, in doing so I explain virtually all of the cross-country variation of the government status variable, as the slope variance of the government dummy falls from 0.27 to 0.07, which is not significantly different from zero (at the \( p = 0.05 \) level) anymore, not shown. The cross-level interaction effect has the predicted negative effect \( (b = -0.15) \), which is significant at the \( p = 0.01 \) level. The Hypothesis 1 variable retains its effect \( (b = 0.16) \) and its significance \( (p < 0.05) \) when I add the interaction effect. According to Model 3, a 1 percent higher success rate of anti-immigration parties in a country is associated with an average shift of 0.16 points to more restrictive policies on a 0–10 scale for opposition parties and a \( 0.16 - 0.15 = 0.01 \) point shift by governing parties. Thus, the change in immigration stances between 2000 and 2004 is affected by the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties in the country in the decade before (Hypothesis 1). However, governing parties are significantly less susceptible to this contagion effect (Hypothesis 3).

As a final model (Model 4), I estimate all the variables that yield a significant impact (either in the predicted or the ‘wrong’ direction) in Model 3.\(^{21}\) When doing so, the Hypothesis 1 \( (b = 0.13, \text{ significant at the } p = 0.05 \text{ level}) \) and Hypothesis 3 \( (b = -0.16, \text{ significant at the } p = 0.001 \text{ level}) \) variables yield effects similar to those in Model 3. Figure 1 captures the effect of government status on the interplay of anti-immigration party success and policy shifts, with the 1990–99 anti-immigration party performance change on the x-axis, and the other parties’ immigration policy shifts in the following five years on the y-axis.

As one can tell from Figure 1, the immigration policy positions of governing parties (represented by the dotted line with the gentle slope) hardly shift at all. Parties in opposition, by contrast, shift to more restrictive immigration positions when anti-immigration parties have increased their vote-shares, and take up more liberal positions when these parties lose votes (indicated by the solid, steep line). The opposition parties’ average shift is estimated at \(-0.04\) points when the country’s anti-immigration party performance change is 1 SD (3.44) below its mean (1.86) at 1.86 – 3.44 = –1.58. Opposition parties are predicted to shift +0.85 points on a 0–10 scale when anti-immigration party success is 1 SD above its mean (at 1.86 + 3.44 = 5.30, not shown).

In sum, I conclude that there is a ‘contagion impact’ (Hypothesis 1) that affects opposition parties more than parties in government (Hypothesis 3). Indeed, contagion appears to have an effect on opposition parties only (see Figure 1). This contagion effect occurs regardless of a party’s ideological position (Hypothesis 2). Niche parties are no less susceptible to it than are other parties (Hypothesis 4).

Finally, one of the control variables tests the argument that in countries where centre–right parties relied on the anti-immigration parties to forge government coalitions, the former parties adopted the policy stances of the latter, notably on immigration. Models 2 and 3 give no support to this
argument. In fact, the effect yielded by the cooperation dummy variable is not in the predicted direction and not statistically significant. This means that, on average, having controlled for all the other relevant variables, the parties that cooperated with the anti-immigration parties were no more affected by their partners than other parties. This finding calls for more research on contagion effects related to cooperation with anti-immigration parties.

Conclusions

The study aimed to assess the effects of the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties on the immigration policy positions of other parties. On the basis of comparative-empirical analyses of 75 parties in 11 West European countries between 1990 and 2004, it is found that the electoral success or failure of anti-immigration parties has a contagion effect on the immigration stances of other parties (Hypothesis 1). When in government, however, parties are not affected by this mechanism (Hypothesis 3). Two hypotheses derived from the extant literature are thrown into question by my findings. Parties that mobilize on niches other than immigration turn out not to be immune to contagion impacts (Hypothesis 4). More generally, rightist parties are not more likely to co-opt the policies of the anti-immigration parties than leftist parties are (Hypothesis 2). This means that the ‘contagion
of the right thesis’ (e.g. Norris, 2005) is not substantiated by the evidence. Some of the established right-wing parties cooperate directly with anti-immigration parties in government. However, even this does not seem to lead these parties to emulate the policy stances that brought the anti-immigration parties their success in these countries.

The findings add up to an interesting pattern. On the one hand, green and (former) communist parties ‘discover’ the immigration issue and reposition on it. On the other, the main right-wing parties are not substantially more affected than other parties – not even if they cooperate closely with successful anti-immigration parties. This could be related to the distribution of voter preferences on the issue on which this specific kind of niche party mobilizes, i.e. immigration. Survey results suggest that in virtually all the contemporary West European countries, a majority of voters is opposed to the idea of the multicultural society (see, e.g., Ivarsflaten, 2005a; Van der Brug and Van Spanje, 2009). This means that if an anti-immigration party has success and the issue becomes salient, all other parties have incentives to take up a restrictive policy position – not just the niche party’s immediate competitors. A left-wing party may attempt to reduce its losses to anti-immigration challengers by withdrawing its support for the ideal of the multicultural society.

However, findings in the relevant literature suggest that it is mainly the right-wing parties that compete with anti-immigration parties (e.g. Carter, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005), and not the left. In the light of these findings, my results suggest that the intensity to which parties compete with the anti-immigration party does not play an important role among the predictors of contagion effects. The extent to which the other parties compete with anti-immigration parties does not appear to structure the contagion mechanisms in the way that would be expected on the basis of Downsian spatial analysis. That is, instead of only influencing individual parties that adapt to immediately-felt electoral pressures, the contagion seems to affect entire party systems (cf. Downs, 2002; Pettigrew, 1998). Based on standard spatial theory of party competition, one could draw the conclusion that co-opting the policy positions of successful rivals is not a knee-jerk response by a party to the competitive environment in which it is embedded.

On the basis of Meguid’s (2005) modified spatial theory of party competition, it could be argued that my findings show that the left engages in strategic repositioning on the immigration policy dimension, just as the right does. On this view, a left-wing party may, for example, try to fuel the anti-immigration parties’ successes by explicitly addressing the issue in the expectation that anti-immigration parties eat more into the mainstream right’s electoral base than into its own. The available data do not allow me to perform further empirical tests on this point, however.

More generally, the findings of this study seem to highlight the fact that a party’s ability to employ vote-maximizing strategies has considerable constraints. When in government, the party leader’s hands are tied, which
may lead to different outcomes than commonly used theories predict. Other factors, such as the alignments within the party and personal preferences of the party leaders, can also play an important role in the response of an established party to the emergence of an anti-immigration party in its polity. In other words, contagion effects are contingent upon the wider context of inter-party and intra-party competition. Future research should focus on the question of how the context matters, and to what extent.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Sarah de Lange, Mark Franklin, André Krouwel, Peter Mair, Wouter van der Brug, Cees van der Eijk, and three anonymous reviewers for *Party Politics* for their useful comments. Any remaining errors or omissions are the author’s sole responsibility.

Notes

1 This should not be confused with the classic controversy over ‘contagion from the left’ versus ‘contagion from the right’ (Duverger, 1954; Epstein, 1967).

2 These two types are often confused. A more restrictive immigration policy is widely considered as ‘rightist’, whereas the ideal of the multicultural society is usually regarded as an idea of the left. As shown empirically in this article, this relation is not as straightforward as it prima facie seems. Recently, many parties of the left have shifted to more restrictive immigration policies, while several parties with a right-wing profile have become less strong advocates of the ideal of cultural unity.

3 ‘Left’ and ‘right’ not only refer to a traditional economic axis here, but also to a broader dimension that encompasses clusters of issue positions, as, for example, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) note. The ‘issues that divide the Left and the Right are linked in ways contingent upon time and space’ (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995: 44).

4 However, the National Front (FN) was electorally unsuccessful in the early 1980s. This calls into question whether the first-mentioned effect can be considered as ‘contagion’ in the sense of this article. In the context of French politics, the actions of Social Democrats like Fabius may be interpreted as attempts to hurt the centre-right by legitimizing the National Front rather than as contagion effects. Such actions dovetail with those of the Social Democratic president Mitterrand in the 1980s. Not only did Mitterrand urge the leaders of the national broadcasting corporations to devote more attention to FN party leader Le Pen in 1982, he also changed the electoral rules to a system of proportional representation before the national elections four years later. This led to the entrance of 34 representatives of the FN in the *Assemblée Nationale* (Mayer, 1998: 21).

5 Perlmutter also takes another Italian party into account, the National Alliance (AN). Whether this party can be seen as anti-immigration at the relevant timepoints is questionable, however. It did not have an anti-immigration stance by 2000 (Lubbers, 2001) or by 2004 (Van Spanje et al., 2006). Nor did the party...
attach much importance to the issue (Benoit and Laver, 2006; Carter, 2005: 33–4). Therefore, the party was not included among the cases selected for this study.

6 Recently, Williams has contributed to the debate with a comprehensive cross-national study on the impact of anti-immigration parties, including contagion effects on the issue of immigration in 17 Western European countries (2006). She did not address the question of how the party positions of mainstream parties are affected by the electoral performance of anti-immigration parties, however. Instead, she examined the position shifts of mainstream parties on this issue as a response to the shifts of the radical right parties. Not much empirical evidence was found on this point, and Williams concludes that ‘the other parties do not adapt their positions on immigration directly because of the position shifts on the issue by radical right-wing parties’ (p. 70).

7 This presupposes that the mainstream parties actually have a position on the immigration policy dimension. As Meguid rightly points out, this is not a given when there is no relevant anti-immigration party in the system (2005: 349). However, I selected countries in which significant anti-immigration party exist only. Moreover, in each of the political contexts that I deal with in this article, contemporary Western European countries, the immigration issue enjoys high degrees of salience (see, e.g., Benoit and Laver, 2006). It can therefore be assumed that parties in these contexts have a position on the immigration issue.

8 If an effect were found in accordance with Hypothesis 4, an alternative explanation would be that a hard line on immigration sits uneasily with the ideologies of far left and green parties. Most notably, the notion of the universal brotherhood might be incompatible with very restrictive immigration policies.

9 The left–right dimension includes more issues than immigration, of course. In addition, party positions in terms of left and right are not only determined by a party’s immigration position, but also by the salience of the immigration issue. However, it is consistent with the line of reasoning of Adams et al. (2006) to expect that the other niche parties stick to their key issues. Moreover, having very left-wing profiles, they are not expected to co-opt policy positions on an issue that is predominantly owned by parties of the right in the countries of study. After all, this would be the same as moderating their ideological positions in terms of left and right, of which Adams et al. (2006) have shown that it presents considerable electoral costs to these parties.

10 Hypothesis 4 may seem difficult to separate from Hypothesis 2. After all, (ex-) communist and green parties are all left-wing. However, the theoretical basis on which Hypothesis 2 is based differs from that of Hypothesis 4. Note that Hypothesis 2 is not about right-wing parties only, but states that the more right-wing its ideologies, the more vulnerable a party is to contagion effect, and green parties are not necessarily far-left parties. The green parties in the sample were all coded as having moderate positions, between 3.46 and 4.24 on average on a 1–10 left–right scale. They can therefore be expected (on the basis of Hypothesis 2) to be vulnerable, and more so than the (ex-)communist parties, that were all placed to the left of the greens. Thus, assessing Hypothesis 2 does not render the assessment of Hypothesis 4 superfluous.

11 Note that this conceptualization is a major departure from the usual classification of parties in the existing literature. Instead of classifying a party according to its origins in society or its ideological background (see Mair and Mudde, 1998), this article introduces a different basis of categorizing parties, which will not be
discussed at length, however, as this does not have a large impact on case selection or results. As mentioned in the text, the group of selected parties is similar to other studies on anti-immigration parties.

12 For a few small parties that were not included in either of these two expert surveys, the author relied on descriptions of party ideology regarding immigration given by Carter (2005).

13 Established parties are defined as parties that already existed before the emergence of the anti-immigration parties in Western Europe at the end of the 1970s. Admittedly, the FPÖ was founded as early as 1955. However, before Haider’s take over in 1986, the FPÖ can be considered as a completely different party from the FPÖ afterwards (e.g. Luther, 2000).

14 Belgium is considered to contain two separate political systems, Flanders and Wallonia. Thus, this adds up to 13 political systems in 12 countries.

15 Even if the question asked in 2004 is identical to the one asked four years earlier, it is questionable whether the immigration restriction scale of 2004 is comparable to that of 2000. If the entire perception of immigration restriction changed in the minds of the experts in these four years, a 4.0 score in 2004 does not mean the same as a 4.0 score in 2000. To the extent that this influences the results, it will have a dampening effect conducive to type-II errors. If empirical evidence is found in support of the hypotheses, it is therefore likely that the impact is even larger than predicted. Because hypotheses 1 and 3 are confirmed on the basis of the available data (see below), this strengthens the findings of the article, however.

16 The reason underlying the choice for change as the major independent variable, rather than the absolute levels of anti-immigration party success, is that the other parties are expected to adjust their positions mainly as a result of ‘electoral shocks’, and not as a result of the mere presence (and possible growth stagnation or vote decrease) of the anti-immigration parties. This methodological choice did not matter much for the findings of this article, as both the change and the average anti-immigration party success by country have significant positive impacts significant at the $p = 0.05$ level.

17 National-level election results are used for this variable. If no national-level elections were held in one or either of these years, then the result was estimated, assuming a linear relation from one election to the next. For example, the combined electoral performance of the anti-immigration parties in Germany in 2000 was estimated by averaging these parties’ results in the national elections of 1998 and 2002. The combined result of the German People’s Union (DVU), National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) and Republicans (REP) was 3.3 percent in the 1998 national elections and 1.0 percent in 2002, which produces a result of $(3.3 + 1.0)/2 = 2.2$ for the year 2000. Because these parties obtained 2.4 percent of the vote in the 1990 national elections together, the change between 1990 and 2000 is estimated at $2.2 - 2.4 = -0.2$. See Table 1 for descriptive analyses of the variable computed in this way.

18 Estimations by experts derived from three surveys conducted at different points in time by Marks and Steenbergen (1999), Lubbers (2001) and Benoit and Laver (2006) are all correlated for more than $r = 0.90$ with the voter perceptions in terms of ‘left’ and ‘right’ derived from the EES at the corresponding time-points (significant at $p = 0.01$, one-tailed).
19 Carter also measured a similar institutional variable, the proportionality of each national election, but this is almost identical to the effective threshold variable ($r = 0.95$).

20 Data are available for virtually every significant party that is not labelled as ‘anti-immigration’. The average vote-share obtained by the parties included in the analyses together is 95 percent, varying from 68 percent in Italy in 2004 to 98 percent in Sweden (also in 2004).

21 The government status dummy is also included in Model 4, because it is a lower-order effect without which the cross-level interaction would be difficult to interpret (see Brambor et al., 2006).

References


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